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The Revolution in Family Law
45
Landmark
Decisions
Four Experts Look
at the Most Significant
Cases Handed Down
During the Last
Two Decades
Editor's Note: Family Advocate asked four family law
specialists to name the decisions that they feel have had
the most impact on family law. Contributing to this list of
cases (beginning on next page) are: Monroe L. Inker, a
Boston attorney; Sanford N. Katz, professor at Boston
College Law School; Frances H. Miller, professor at
Boston University School of Law; and Walter Weyrauch,
professor at the University of Florida College of Law in
Gainesville. The introduction, which discusses major
family law developments, is by Randall M. Chastain,
professor at the University of South Carolina.
Liberal divorce reform, like most major social legisla-
tion, did not herald the coming of social changes, but
reflected views that already existed. The interplay of
forces seeking liberal or conservative divorce laws has
been with us for years. The result, however, has not been
a continuous, if gradual, movement toward more liberal
approaches, but rather an up-and-down movement.
In 1849, for example, Connecticut passed a divorce law
that permitted divorce for "any such misconduct as per-
manently destroys the happiness of the petitioner and
defeats the purpose of the marriage relation." (Public
Act 1849.17) Despite its reference to "misconduct," this
was essentially a unilateral divorce statute since the
nature of misconduct is made dependent upon the
destruction of the petitioner's happiness and defeating
the purpose of the marriage relation. The divorce rate in
Connecticut rose so dramatically after the statute was
passed that it was repealed in 1878.
The debate over what should constitute justifiable rea-
sons for dissolving a marriage raged with vigor between
the end of the Civil War and the beginning of World War
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II. Legislatures tended to remain on the conservative side, ferent than when Chester G. Vernier surveyed the coun-
reversing a trend toward liberalization that had existed try's divorce laws in 1931. At that time, every jurisdiction
before the Civil War. But by the late 1940s, the country that permitted divorce-all American jurisdictions ex-
had begun a process of social rethinking that continues to cept South Carolina-recognized adultery as a ground
this day. for divorce. Not one jurisdiction directly recognized a no-
NO-FAULT DIVORCE fault ground.
Then it was time for the pendulum to swing back to
In the 1950s, however, the laws were not much dif- more liberal approaches to divorce access. And by 1969,
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the California legislature passed a law permitting dissolu-
tion of marriage simply on the basis of irreconcilable dif-
ferences. (See Cal. Civil Code § 4506 (w. 1970.) This en-
actment both legitimized and energized the already ex-
isting movement toward change, and was probably the
single event in no-fault divorce.
By August 1980, Illinois and South Dakota were the
only two states that still limited divorce to traditional
"fault" grounds. And today, California has gone so far
as to allow divorce to be granted by affidavit under some
circumstances.
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION IN
COMMON LAW STATES
As of 1981, Mississippi, Virginia, and West Virginia
were the only three states that could be definitely cate-
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gorized as "title" states in which their courts have no
power to distribute property upon divorce unless one of
the traditional equitable trust doctrines can be applied, or
unless the property was jointly titled to begin with. While
there is some question about the exact extent and reach of
notions of equitable distribution of property to either
spouse regardless of how it is titled, the bulk of the com-
mon law states have joined the eight community property
states in at least considering the notion of marriage as
partnership.
In Wirth v. Wirth, 326 N.Y.S. 2d 308 (App. Div. 1971),
for example, the court refused to be "set in motion" by
allegations that a husband lived solely off his wife's earn-
ings for more than ten years after representing to her that
he was going to invest his earnings "for the two of them"
for their "latter days," and then claimed title to all the
savings as well as the rest of the property. The court noted
that it might be possible to make a moral judgment re-
garding the husband's representations, activities, and
claims, but was willing to do more than that.
But in 1980, New York passed a comprehensive equi-
table distribution statute. A memorandum that accom-
panied the revising act establishing equitable distribution
included the following:
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This legislation proposes the adoption of law to cur-
rent social values. It is hoped it will serve to bring
New York law into today's reality which will serve
the best interests of the family.
This indicates the shift in attitude in which marriage is no
longer viewed as a joining together of a provider and
homemaker. "Current social values" demand that mar-
riage be treated as something of a business, which is com-
mensurate with the attitude that it ought to be dissolvable
when either party is dissatisfied with any aspect of it.
Because of this ready acceptance of dissolution and the
easing of the way for it financially, the increase of divorce
is likely to continue. This in turn will put pressure on
family lawyers and family courts to process cases through
the system in a prompt, efficient, and yet morally and
emotionally satisfactory fashion.
RECOGNITION OF TAX CONSEQUENCES
OF DIVORCE AND SETTLEMENTS
If lawyers do not specialize in tax law or family law,
they may overlook the potential tax effects of support
monies characterized as alimony and child support, and
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of property distributions characterized as division of pre-
viously owned property, support, or as property ex-
changed for release of marital rights. Because many thou-
sands of dollars in federal and state taxes can ride on these
determinations, the potential for malpractice liability is
awesome.
The need to consider tax consequences throughly was
illustrated in United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962)
and Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
Although these decisions are 20 years old, their ramifica-
tions have taken some time to penetrate the profession.
Certainly tax consequences were important before
Davis and Lester, which highlight the potentially
devastating tax effects of an improperly planned divorce.
But the radical tax increases that were needed to support
the Second World War, which have remained on the
scene, combined with the effects of inflation and the
failure to index the tax laws to inflation, have rendered in-
come tax considerations more important than they were
in the 1940s and 50s.
CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT
Recent uniform acts such as the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), its descendant,
RURESA, and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act (UCCJA), and federal enactments such as the
Federal Child Support Enforcement Program under the
Social Services Amendments of 1974 and the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, have in yet another
way required the family lawyer to look beyond the nar-
row confines of state statute and decisional law. They
reflect a social determination that the "local" business of
child custody, child support, and enforcement of
alimony decrees is a matter of nationwide concern.
Within the last decade, there has been an increased
realization that white-and blue-collar workers are not on-
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ly capable of earning reasonable incomes, but can be ef-
fectively traced by more efficient use of the mechanisms
already in place. Thus, their earnings can be used for
legitimate support purposes. Perhaps the single most ef-
fective national legal reform in the last several years has
been the federal government's creation of the Parent
Locator Service. This service allows properly identified
cases to be handled with the assistance of federal data.
INDEPENDENT LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
During the last 25 years, courts and psychologists have
recognized that legal infants-persons under the age of 18
years old-have independent legal rights and can to some
extent see them enforced in the court system. Although
there has been no clear consensus in this area, the
developments have indicated that the court system, as
well as the psychiatric and psychological professions, is
aware of the need to evaluate children individually-not
merely as insensate ciphers in a system in which the real
participants are adults.
There is some tension between this concept and that of
familial privacy. The interplay between parental rights
and children's rights and the working out of the limits of
interaction between family units and the legal structure
probably will be one of the principal areas of develop-
ment in family law in the final two decades of the twen-
tieth century.
Domestic relations law has and will continue to become
more complex largely because of an increased social
awareness of the consequences of legal decision making
in family matters. Moreover, the role of the law in
regulating both family activity and the interaction of the
family with society bodes to become ever-greater.
Whether this is as it should be is something we will have to
decide in our legislatures and courts over the next 25
years. N
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